St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks,
509 U.S. 502 (1993)

The Defendant was a halfway house that employed the Plaintiff, Hicks, as a correctional officer. Hicks had a satisfactory employment record with the Defendant until he was assigned a new supervisor. After that, Hicks began to be singled out for reprimands, was demoted, and eventually was fired. Hicks brought suit in federal court under Title VII for race discrimination.

The district court found that Hicks had established, by a preponderance of the evidence, a prima facie case of racial discrimination; that the Defendant had rebutted that presumption by introducing evidence of two legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for their actions; and that the Defendant’s reasons were pretextual. Despite this, the district court held that the Plaintiff had not carried his burden of proving that his termination was racially, not personally, motivated. The Eighth Circuit set aside this determination on the ground that, once the Plaintiff proved all of the Defendant’s proffered reasons for the adverse employment actions were pretextual, the Plaintiff was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.

The Defendant appealed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari. The Supreme Court noted that, once Hicks made out his prima facie case of discrimination, a presumption arose that the Defendant unlawfully discriminated against him. The Defendant then had the burden of producing a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason which, if believed by the trier of fact, would support a finding that it did not discriminate. As in the case of all presumptions, however, the ultimate burden of persuasion remained at all times with Hicks.

The Supreme Court ruled that the Eighth Circuit erred when it concluded that the trier of fact’s disbelief of the Defendant’s proffered reasons placed the Defendant in the same position as if it had remained silent in the face of Hicks’ prima facie case of racial discrimination. Indeed, all the Defendant had to do under the McDonnell Douglas test was produce evidence of nondiscriminatory reasons, whether ultimately persuasive or not, to rebut the presumption of intentional discrimination. Hicks then had to prove the ultimate question of fact: that the Defendant intentionally discriminated against him because of his race.

The high Court said that compelling judgment for Hicks would disregard the fundamental principle that a presumption does not shift the burden of proof and would ignore the admonition that a Title VII plaintiff, at all times, bears the ultimate burden of persuasion. The Court went on to say that no court may impose liability on any employer for alleged discriminatory employment practices unless the factfinder determines that the employer has unlawfully discriminated. Nor may a court substitute for that required finding the much different and much lesser finding that the employer’s explanation of its action was not believable.

In this case, the Supreme Court resolved the confusion surrounding the differing approaches to pretext. The Eighth Circuit had applied what is known as the "pretext only" standard, which says that, once a plaintiff has established that the defendant’s reasons were pretextual, he is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. The Supreme Court rejected this standard, holding that rejection of the proffered reasons does not require that judgment be entered for the plaintiff.

The Supreme Court also rejected what is known as the "pretext plus" approach, which requires, for a finding of discrimination, that the factfinder’s disbelief of the proffered reasons must be supported by additional direct evidence of discrimination. The Supreme Court held that disbelief of the defendant’s proffered reasons will, by itself, permit the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of intentional discrimination. No additional proof of discrimination is required.

Indeed, what the Supreme Court ultimately adopted is known as the "permissive pretext" approach. That standard makes clear that, in the instance where the factfinder does not believe the defendant’s proffered reasons, the factfinder may, but is not required to, enter a judgment for the plaintiff at that point with no further proof of discrimination.

The Supreme Court in St. Mary’s Honor Center v.Hicks reversed the Eighth Circuit and remanded the case for proceedings consistent with its opinion.

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