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St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks,
509 U.S. 502 (1993)
The Defendant was a halfway house that employed the Plaintiff, Hicks, as a
correctional officer. Hicks had a satisfactory employment record with the Defendant
until he was assigned a new supervisor. After that, Hicks began to be singled
out for reprimands, was demoted, and eventually was fired. Hicks brought suit
in federal court under Title VII for race discrimination.
The district court found that Hicks had established, by a preponderance of
the evidence, a prima facie case of racial discrimination; that the Defendant
had rebutted that presumption by introducing evidence of two legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reasons for their actions; and that the Defendant’s reasons were pretextual.
Despite this, the district court held that the Plaintiff had not carried his burden
of proving that his termination was racially, not personally, motivated. The Eighth
Circuit set aside this determination on the ground that, once the Plaintiff proved
all of the Defendant’s proffered reasons for the adverse employment actions
were pretextual, the Plaintiff was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
The Defendant appealed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari. The Supreme
Court noted that, once Hicks made out his prima facie case of discrimination,
a presumption arose that the Defendant unlawfully discriminated against him. The
Defendant then had the burden of producing a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason
which, if believed by the trier of fact, would support a finding that it did not
discriminate. As in the case of all presumptions, however, the ultimate burden
of persuasion remained at all times with Hicks.
The Supreme Court ruled that the Eighth Circuit erred when it concluded that
the trier of fact’s disbelief of the Defendant’s proffered reasons placed
the Defendant in the same position as if it had remained silent in the face of
Hicks’ prima facie case of racial discrimination. Indeed, all the Defendant
had to do under the McDonnell Douglas test was produce evidence of nondiscriminatory
reasons, whether ultimately persuasive or not, to rebut the presumption of intentional
discrimination. Hicks then had to prove the ultimate question of fact: that the
Defendant intentionally discriminated against him because of his race.
The high Court said that compelling judgment for Hicks would disregard the
fundamental principle that a presumption does not shift the burden of proof and
would ignore the admonition that a Title VII plaintiff, at all times, bears the
ultimate burden of persuasion. The Court went on to say that no court may impose
liability on any employer for alleged discriminatory employment practices unless
the factfinder determines that the employer has unlawfully discriminated. Nor
may a court substitute for that required finding the much different and much lesser
finding that the employer’s explanation of its action was not believable.
In this case, the Supreme Court resolved the confusion surrounding the differing
approaches to pretext. The Eighth Circuit had applied what is known as the "pretext
only" standard, which says that, once a plaintiff has established that the
defendant’s reasons were pretextual, he is entitled to a judgment as a matter
of law. The Supreme Court rejected this standard, holding that rejection of the
proffered reasons does not require that judgment be entered for the plaintiff.
The Supreme Court also rejected what is known as the "pretext plus"
approach, which requires, for a finding of discrimination, that the factfinder’s
disbelief of the proffered reasons must be supported by additional direct evidence
of discrimination. The Supreme Court held that disbelief of the defendant’s
proffered reasons will, by itself, permit the trier of fact to infer the ultimate
fact of intentional discrimination. No additional proof of discrimination is required.
Indeed, what the Supreme Court ultimately adopted is known as the "permissive
pretext" approach. That standard makes clear that, in the instance where
the factfinder does not believe the defendant’s proffered reasons, the factfinder
may, but is not required to, enter a judgment for the plaintiff at that point
with no further proof of discrimination.
The Supreme Court in St. Mary’s Honor Center v.Hicks reversed the
Eighth Circuit and remanded the case for proceedings consistent with its opinion.
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