Scott v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,
160 F.3d 1121 (6^th Cir. (Ohio) Nov. 20, 1998)

Scott worked for Goodyear for forty-one years. His final position with the company was Operations Manager. In 1993, Goodyear began a restructuring of its management which eliminated the jobs of five Operations Managers, including Scott. The other Operations Managers whose positions were eliminated were ages 63, 51, 35 and 32. Scott was 61 years old at the time of his termination, and he was not redeployed.

In December of 1993, two human resources managers were sent to tell Scott of his termination. One of the managers, Gable, told Scott that his position was being eliminated and that he had three options for his future. He could accept layoff status and receive no benefits and no possibility of recall, he could accept layoff status and receive supplemental unemployment benefits on a regular basis and remain under consideration for any new positions which came available, or he could accept an early retirement and receive a large lump sum payment, monthly retirement checks, and continued health benefits. Scott chose retirement.

After his retirement, Scott brought an action under the ADEA. During the discovery stage, Scott compiled a number of suspicious facts. First, he discovered that the manner of his termination had irregular. Gable, who was normally given the authority to inquire into the basis for employment decisions, had asked management why Scott was fired. He had been told that no reason would be given to him. Furthermore, several of the executives who made the decision to discharge Scott had made comments which suggested an age-based animus. One executive, Ed Gallagher, had said, "This company is run by a bunch of white haired old men, waiting to retire and adding that "This must change." He also said, "Some people will lose their jobs, but in time, we will replace them with young college graduates at less money." Finally, Scott presented statistical evidence showing that the corporate restructuring replaced slightly more older than younger employees.

Despite all of this evidence, the district court granted Goodyear summary judgment, stating that there was no evidence that Goodyear had forced Scott into an early retirement because of his age. Furthermore, the district court held that Scott failed to present a prima facie case of age discrimination because he had voluntarily accepted retirement.

The Sixth Circuit said that, for purposes of its review, the case would turn on two issues: whether the actions taken against Scott could be construed as constructive termination, and if so, whether Scott had provided sufficient evidence of discriminatory intent to create a factual issue regarding pretext.

Because Scott accepted the retirement option, the Court of Appeals said that Scott could not prevail on a theory of actual discharge, but must rely on the constructive discharge doctrine. The court noted that the law in the Sixth Circuit is clear that a constructive discharge exists if working conditions are such that a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s shoes would feel compelled to resign. Scott argued that this was the case in his situation since he felt that Goodyear had no intention of recalling him. The court noted that signing an early retirement agreement does not normally constitute a constructive discharge. The court held that in the instant case, however, the odd directives given to Gable warranted further examination of the claim.

Of particular interest to the court was the fact that Gable had been specifically told not to offer Scott a lower position with the company in lieu of being laid off. Furthermore, the court said that since Gable had not been able to offer Scott any reasons for his termination, Scott had been justified in his fear that he would not be recalled. Thus, the doctrine of constructive discharge would apply in this case.

The Sixth Circuit then turned to the question of whether Scott could create a factual issue on the pretext question. Examining the facts of the case, the court noted that the two older managers had not been redeployed, while the younger ones had. Furthermore, the court noted Scott’s statistical evidence showing that in the entire corporate restructuring fewer young people were terminated than old. Finally, the court noted the discriminatory remarks made by management. Ultimately, the court held that all of the suspicious facts that Scott demonstrated on the record did give rise to a jury question as to whether Scott had been discriminated against because of his age. Having so found, the court reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Goodyear and remanded the case for proceedings consistent with its opinion.

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