Godfredson v. Hess & Clark, Inc.,
173 F.3d 365 (6^th Cir. (Ohio) Apr. 8, 1999)

Hess & Clark bought the company for which the Plaintiff, Godfredson, worked. Hess & Clark then hired the Plaintiff, putting him in charge of marketing for two of the Defendant’s divisions. The employment agreement, which the Plaintiff signed, made clear that the employment relationship was at will and that the Plaintiff could be fired with or without cause.

The division for which the Plaintiff worked failed to turn a profit and was eliminated by the Defendant. This necessitated a workforce reduction, in which Godfredson and eighteen other employees were terminated. Godfredson claimed that his termination was because of his age and that his severance package was smaller than those given to younger workers. Specifically, he referred to one employee, terminated a year before, who had received six months severance pay while Godfredson had received only two.

The district court noted that, of the eighteen employees fired, ten were under forty years of age. Furthermore, Godfredson admitted that he was only aware of two other people out of the eighteen terminated who were even offered severance packages, and that those packages were the same or less than his own. The district court held that Godfredson had failed to make out a prima facie case of age discrimination and granted summary judgment to Hess & Clark.

On appeal the Sixth Circuit held that ADEA cases must be analyzed under the McDonnell Douglas framework. Furthermore, the Court noted that, if the plaintiff is discharged in connection with a reduction in workforce, then the fourth prong of the McDonnell Douglas test for making a prima facie case will be an adequate showing of additional direct, circumstantial, or statistical evidence tending to indicate that the employer singled her out for discharge for impermissible reasons.

In applying the McDonnell Douglas framework to the case, the Court of Appeals noted that the parties agreed that the Plaintiff was a member of the protected class and that he had been subjected to an adverse employment decision. There was a dispute, however, as to whether he had been qualified for his particular position. On this issue, Godfredson argued that other people had been at least partially responsible for the problems associated with the division. In response, the Defendant argued that Godfredson was not qualified because he had held a management position of significant responsibility in a division that failed, causing millions of dollars in loses. The court found that the question was a close one and one upon which Godfredson had raised a genuine issue of material fact.

Next, the Sixth Circuit questioned whether Godfredson had been terminated as part of a reduction in workforce. The court held that an employee is not eliminated as part of a workforce reduction when she is replaced her discharge. The Court, however, stated that a person is not replaced when another employee is assigned to perform the plaintiff’s duties in addition to her other duties, or when the work is redistributed among other existing employees already performing related work. Godfredson pointed out that two employees had been assigned to perform the tasks he used to do. The Defendant, though. proved that these two persons were not new hires, but rather were existing employees who were asked to assume Godfredson’s duties after his discharge in addition to their other duties.

The Court of Appeals, therefore, concluded that Godfredson had been terminated as part of a genuine reduction in workforce and that he thus must establish that there was additional direct, circumstantial, or statistical evidence tending to indicate that the employer had singled out the plaintiff for discharge. To this effect, the court simply noted that Godfredson was one of eighteen employees fired, many of them younger than him. That being the case, and since Godfredson failed to present any other credible evidence that he was singled out for termination, the Sixth Circuit held that Godfredson failed to make out a prima facia case of discrimination.

The court went on to note, that even if Godfredson had made out a prima facie case of discrimination, he still would not have been able to show that the Defendant’s proffered reason for the termination was a pretext for discrimination. That could only be done by showing that the employer’s reason had no basis in fact, did not actually motivate the decision, or had never been used in the past as a reason to discharge an employee. The fact that Godfredson’s entire division was eliminated and eighteen others were fired was enough to prevent such a showing.

The Sixth Circuit then held that Godfredson was not entitled to a transfer within the company because employers have no duty to transfer an employee to another position within the company when the workforce is reduced for economic reasons.

Finally, the Sixth Circuit held that Godfredson had not been discriminated against with regard to his severance pay since he failed to prove that the employee who received a larger severance package was a similarly situated employee.

For all of the above-mentioned reasons, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment.

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